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1II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.  The District Court Erred in Concluding that Counsel’s Advice to Lie Was Not
Deficient Performance in this Case.
The state, in its response, ignores the Supreme Court’s instruction that
attorneys may not assist clients in presenting false evidence or otherwise violate
the law.  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 512, 348 P.3d 1, 127 (2015), citing Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166-68 (1986).  While Mr. Steinemer is not saying counsel
“forced” him to say he had reviewed the evidence - that’s a strawman argument by
the state - he is saying counsel advised him to lie about having reviewed all the
discovery.  Thus, even if the state were correct that trial counsel did not instruct
Mr. Steinemer to lie to court because he merely advised Mr. Steinemer that the
plea would not be accepted absent a lie (while at the same time urging Mr.
Steinemer to plead guilty), there is no doubt that “advice” assisted Mr. Steinemer in
presenting false evidence to the court.  
The state is mistaken when it asserts that trial counsel’s action was not
 tantamount to telling Mr. Steinemer to lie to the court. Its argument is facile
because it ignores the fact there are nuances in spoken language and the argument
is based upon a pretense that we live in a world where conversations have only
literal meaning.  This is obviously not the case, as illustrated by a famous scene in
the film “Anatomy of a Murder.”  Attorney Paul Beigler (played by James Stewart)
explains to his client, Army Lieutenant Frederick Manion (Ben Gazarra), that
“there are four ways I can defend murder” and “[y]ou don’t fit in any of the first
three.”  Manion asks: “If you’re not telling me to cop out, what are you telling me to
1http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/ anatomy_ of_a_murder.pdf, pg. 27-28.
State v. Fritz, 569 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. App. 1997); Boyd v. State, 797 So.2d 356,2
362 (Miss. App. 2001); McCombs v. State, 3 So.3d 950 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).  
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do?”  Attorney Beiger says, “I’m not telling you to do anything. I want you to know
the letter of the law.”  He then asks: “What’s your legal excuse, Lieutenant Manion
– your legal excuse for killing Barney Quill?”  Eventually, Manion comes up with
the answer Beiger has been waiting for: “I must have been crazy.”  Beigler, putting
on his hat as he leaves the interview room, tells his client to “see if you can
remember just how crazy you were.”  1  In that way, the attorney told his client to
make up a story about being insane at the time of the murder, even though he has
only explained “the letter of the law.”  A similar thing happened here.
Such advice falls below an objective standard of reasonableness because
counsel may not encourage a client to present false testimony.  Abdullah, supra.  In
this regard, it is worth noting that the state does not address the authority Mr.
Steinemer cited for this proposition in the Opening Brief.   Instead, it relies upon a2
2006 unpublished United States District Court order, Jefferson v. Bartlett, 2006 WL
3408020, at *8 (D. Or. 2006), aff'd, 280 F. App’x 574 (9  Cir. 2008), which is notth
even citable authority.  See Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b).  In that case, the defense
attorney told his client that he did not believe the jury would believe the client’s
story and his client testified differently at trial.  The difference between Jefferson
and this case is that Mr. Jefferson’s trial counsel believed his client’s story was false
and was urging him to testify truthfully.  Here, trial counsel knew Mr. Steinemer
3was telling him the truth but encouraged him to testify falsely.
Mr. Steinemer established a prima facie case of deficient performance and
the court should not have dismissed the claim on that basis.
B.  This Court Should not Consider a Basis for Summary Dismissal Raised for the
First Time on Appeal.
The state argues that in the alternative the petition could be summarily
dismissed for failure to show prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
688 (1984).  State’s Brief, pg. 12.  However, that argument was not raised in its
Motion for Summary Dismissal, R 20-21, or in the Answer and Brief in Support of
Summary Dismissal,  R 28-38, or at the hearing on its motion.  Tr. 1/16/15, p. 5-9. 
This Court should not resolve this case on a basis not raised below.  The Supreme
Court has stated that: 
Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in
violation of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met
when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be
heard.  The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.
In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233, 242, 296 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 829, 203 P.3d 1221,
1228 (2009) (same).  In the post-conviction context, due process is provided by the
giving of advance notice through a motion from the district court or by the
respondent particularly stating the basis for dismissal combined with an
opportunity to present evidence to contradict the assertions made in that notice. 
I.C. § 19-2906.
4Here, the state argued below that trial counsel’s performance was not
deficient.  The state’s argument was the basis of the district court’s summary
dismissal.  Mr. Steinemer did not need to respond with evidence to an argument
which was not being made in the trial court proceedings and it would violate his 
due process rights for this Court to affirm the district court on a new theory.
Therefore, the Court should decline the state’s invitation to address this new issue
for the first time on appeal.  Caldwell v. State, 159 Idaho 233, 239, 358 P.3d 794,
800 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied (2015) (Affirming the district court’s decision on
a basis not raised below would be akin to the district court summarily dismissing a
petition on a basis other than what the state provided him notice of and would
violate petitioner’s right, pursuant to I.C. § 19–4906(b), to twenty days’ notice that
his petition was subject to dismissal on this new basis and an opportunity to present
additional evidence to meet the argument.)
Even if the state’s prejudice argument were to be considered, it is without
merit.
First, the cases cited by the state are also not opposite.  The trial court in Ex
parte Tomlinson, 295 S.W.3d 412, 421 (Tex. App. 2009), did not find that trial
counsel encouraged his client to lie.  Here, trial counsel did advise his client to lie. 
Second, the appellate court in Tomlinson stated it could not conclude that “the
guilty plea was the result of the erroneous advice of counsel,” given the very
favorable terms of the plea agreement - “eight years of deferred-adjudication
community supervision.”  295 S.W.3d at 421.  Here, however, Mr. Steinemer moved
5to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing showing that he did, in fact, want to
proceed to trial once he had actually reviewed the discovery.  Anderson v. State, 746
N.W.2d 901, 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), is distinguishable because the court found
that Anderson suffered no prejudice as “[i]t is undisputed that Anderson admitted
guilt because she intended the admission to facilitate the outcome she preferred,
which was the district court's acceptance of her plea.”  Here, Mr. Steinemer made a
timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
To the extent that Anderson holds that an attorney’s advice to lie in order to
get a guilty plea accepted can never be prejudicial because “advice to lie under oath
should be rejected by even the least enlightened defendant,” that holding should be
rejected by this Court.  Nothing in Strickland suggests in the least that some
erroneous advice can be so bad that it must be rejected by the client as a matter of
law.  Here, Mr. Steinemer actually took trial counsel’s bad advice to lie during the
plea colloquy.  The advice prejudiced him because, as he averred, “If I would have
known what was on the video/[audio] I would never have taken a deal.  I would
have had my right to proceed to trial.”  R 11.  Thus, Mr. Steinemer has made a
prima facie case of prejudice. Had trial counsel advised Mr. Steinemer that he could
not enter the plea until he has a chance to review the discovery, Mr. Steinemer
would have done so.  Once he had done so, he would not have entered the plea at
all.
The Court should not reach the prejudice argument, but even if it does, Mr.
Steinemer has raised a genuine question of material fact as to prejudice and an
6evidentiary hearing should have been granted.  
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and in the Opening Brief, this Court should hold that
the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim. Mr. Steinemer raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to both prongs of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. 
Respectfully submitted this 20  day of July, 2016. th
________/s/________________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Douglas Steinemer
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